NPD: Canada’s First Nuclear Power Station
Forty years ago, on June 4, 1962, NPD produced and delivered to Canadian consumers the first electricity in Canada using nuclear energy as the primary energy source. This presentation, at this Deep River Branch of the Canadian Nuclear Society, is the beginning of the celebration of this Canadian historical event. Next week I will be making the same presentation to the Plenary Session of the Canadian Nuclear Society. I am grateful for this opportunity to participate this evening and to attend the ceremony tomorrow at the site of NPD at Rolphton, Ontario. As most of you may know, NPD, which stands for Nuclear Power Demonstration, was the first major stage in the highly successful Canadian nuclear-electric program in Canada.
On the easel I have mounted an enlarged copy of the photograph taken on April 11, 1962, the day the nuclear reactor first started (went critical).
Deep River was the residential community of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) employees located at Chalk River, Ontario and later was the residential community for Ontario Hydro employees who operated NPD and its associated Nuclear Training Centre. It is appropriate that the beginning of this 40th year celebration start at Deep River, Ontario for two reasons:
(1) First, the Canadian nuclear-electric program is based on the CANDU- PHW (CANadian Deuterium Uranium - Pressurized Heavy Water) concept which was conceived between 1955 and 1958 at the Chalk River National Laboratory (CRNL) of AECL located a few miles from Deep River.
(2) Second, NPD was located on the Ontario bank of the Ottawa River also a few miles from Deep River.
I personally knew and admired the contributions of many hundreds of people in Canada and from abroad who contributed to the Canadian nuclear program and in particular to the development, design, construction, manufacturing and operation of NPD. Because of my time limitation this evening , I have chosen to talk about ‘what was done’ and ‘why it was done’ and not talk about ‘who did it.’
My presentation is divided into 6 parts as follows:
1 Before NPD (1939 to 1955)
2. NPD1 - Started Building (1955 to 1958)
3. Ontario Hydro and AECL Studies (1955 to 1958)
4. NPD1 Cancelled and NPD2 Built (1958 to 1962)
5. NPD2 Experience (Starting1962)
6 Two Retrospective Commentaries
Part 1 - BEFORE NPD (1939 to 1955)
World War 2 - 1939 to 1945
The Chalk River National Laboratory was created during World War 2. The USA nuclear bomb program had two major thrusts: (a) to build nuclear bombs using Uranium-235 extracted from natural uranium in an enrichment plant and (b) to build nuclear bombs using plutonium-239 produced in low flux graphite moderated reactors. The Canadian-British program undertook the more certain but slower path to build nuclear bombs using plutonium-239 produced in heavy water moderated reactors. During the war, NRX which stands for National Research EXperimental had two objectives:
(1) the military objective I have just described and
(2) provide a research facility to advance nuclear science.
Although NRX was designed and constructed during World War 2, it did not start up until 1947 some 2 years after the end of the war. NRX was the world’s first high flux nuclear reactor and it featured heavy water as a moderator and natural uranium metal as a fuel. It was fitted with many superb experimental features subsequently used for early Canadian, British, and American development. NRX was a key facility in advancing nuclear science in Canada and the world. NRX proved the high amount of energy that could be produced per kilogram of natural uranium in a heavy water moderated reactor. Note: The energy available from natural uranium in a graphite moderated reactor is much lower than a heavy water moderated reactor and a reactor will not function with natural uranium and a light water moderator. This high energy availability per kilogram of natural uranium in heavy water moderated reactors became the cornerstone of the subsequent CANDU-PHW concept. The result is a very low fuelling unit energy cost which results in economic production of electricity.
USA Nuclear Submarine - Late 1940s
In the late 1940s the USA Navy undertook to design and build a nuclear submarine, called the Nautilus. This submarine featured a pressure vessel, a light water moderator and enriched uranium fuel. The testing of the fuel was done in NRX, at that time the only high flux reactor in the world. This was done in a high pressure, high temperature loop. Important lessons were learned which established the proper approach to controlling the conditions in the heat transport system. The experiences from the operation of this high pressure, high temperature test loop had a major influence on NPD in establishing:
- the design parameters (pressures, temperatures etc.) and
- the operating chemical controls to manage the erosion and corrosion of the heat transport system.
NRX Incident - 1952
In 1952, at NRX, a zero power fuel burnup measurement was being conducted which required that the normal water cooling of some fuel rods be temporarily replaced with air cooling. During this measurement, an unintended power excursion occurred which resulted in the rupture of these air cooled fuel rods. Following an investigation of the causes of this accident, a set of design and operating safety principles was developed, to ensure there would be no repeat of such an event. This accident had a major influence on the design of the control and safety systems in all subsequent nuclear reactors in Canada including NPD.
Ontario Generation of Electricity - 1900 to 1950
During the period from 1900 to 1950, Ontario Hydro successfully developed and built many low total unit energy cost hydro-electric generating stations which contributed to the industrial success in Ontario. Similar successful hydro-electric programs were established in Quebec, Manitoba and British Columbia. However, in Ontario, the undeveloped economic hydro-electric capacity was small compared with the forecast need for future electricity demand. Thus about 1950 Ontario Hydro started committing a series of thermal-electric generating stations burning coal produced (mined and processed) in the USA.
Also about 1950, Ontario Hydro became interested in the development of nuclear-electric generating stations using natural uranium which was, in general, indigenous to Canada and in particular, indigenous to Ontario. Note: In the later full scale Canadian nuclear-electric program, this indigenous natural uranium:
increased Canadian mining, refining, and manufacturing jobs;
improved the balance-of-trade;
and reduced the cost of electricity to consumers.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy - Post World War 2
When World War 2 ended , Canada decided to discontinue its military nuclear objectives and pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Two major thrusts were established (a) the production of radio-isotopes and (b) the production of heat and electricity. Atomic Energy of Canada was created in 1952 by a Federal Act to pursue these peaceful objectives.
In the early 1950s both the USA and the UK had committed the construction of nuclear-electric generating stations and plans were being developed in other countries such as France, Germany, USSR and Japan.
Private Enterprise Competition
The USA (United States Atomic Energy Commission) and United Kingdom (United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority) were committed to the development of nuclear-electric generating stations using competitive design and supply companies. Up to 1950, thermal-electric generating units were typically up to 50 MWe units in size but thousands of MWe were required to meet future demands.
Canada decided to follow the lead of the USA and the UK and pursue the establishment of competing private companies to design and construct nuclear-electric generating stations.
1954 Study Group
A Nuclear Power Group was established in 1954 at AECL that produced a general basis for the design of a 20 MWe demonstration plant and an associated capital cost estimate. In addition to 5 AECL employees, this group included 9 persons seconded from public and private companies. It was supervised by an Ontario Hydro manager.
Part 2 - NPD1 STARTED BUILDING (1955 to 1958)
NPD Committed - 1955
In the early 1950s, Atomic Energy of Canada solicited proposals from all of the utilities and companies in Canada (both private and public) to participate in the development of a nuclear-electric program. Based on the solicited proposals and the results of the 1954 Study Group, NPD1 was committed in 1955, it featured:
an electric capacity of 20MWe,
a vertical pressure vessel,
a heavy water moderator,
natural uranium dioxide fuel, and
These features were directly the result of the foregoing experiences in Canada namely:
(a) NRX - the natural uranium heavy water moderated reactor ;
(b) the experiences in the operation of the high pressure, high temperature loop for the American submarine program and
(c) the design and operating safety principles which were formulated subsequent to the 1952 NRX incident.
Canada had experience in NRX with both natural uranium metal fuel and natural uranium oxide. Natural uranium oxide fuel was selected because it had superior corrosion resistance and dimensional stability characteristics in spite of the fact that uranium metal had the potential of a lower fuelling unit energy cost. At that time Canada had some experience with the use of thorium and uranium 233. Canada also had some experience with enriched uranium 235 fuels operating in sodium potassium heat transport. AECL had also performed considerable research & development for the UK on the irradiation of graphite in the NRX reactor. AECL was not attracted to graphite reactors because of the lower fuel burnup and the dimensional instability of graphite.
The responsibility for the development, design, construction and operation of this unit was as follows:
(a) AECL continued to perform the necessary research and development and paid for most of the cost of the nuclear steam generating system.
(b) The Canadian General Electric Company, Civilian Atomic Power Department (CGE-CAPD) designed the nuclear steam generating system, oversaw the plant construction, and undertook manufacturing of certain components.
(c) Ontario Hydro provided the site, designed the balance of plant, paid for the balance of plant, and was to commission and operate the station.
(d) Ontario Hydro was to reimburse AECL for all energy produced at a rate based on what Ontario Hydro would have paid if the electricity had been generated from coal.
(e) Public tenders were solicited from private enterprise for the design and supply of most of the plant components.
NPD1 1955 to 1958
During the period from 1955 to 1958 , the following actions took place:
(a) to support the design of NPD, AECL research and development continued at Chalk River augmented by development by CGE in Peterborough and Ontario Hydro development at the Dobson Research Laboratory in Toronto.
(b) most of the design of NPD1 was completed by the Canadian General Electric Co. at Peterborough and Ontario Hydro in Toronto.
(c) most plant components had been ordered through competitive tender and were in an advanced stage of manufacture.
(d) the construction of the plant was underway and was being performed by Canadian Bechtel Ltd. under the direction of GGE.
(e) the key operating staff had been recruited by Ontario Hydro and a rigorous training program established.
By 1958, it was clear that the final cost would be much greater than the original estimate of about 8 million dollars. A cost review was performed which indicated the cost would be closer to 34 million dollars.
Part 3 - ONTARIO HYDRO AND AECL STUDIES 1955 TO 1958
Ontario Hydro Planning 1955 to 1958
During the 1950s Ontario Hydro had built or committed coal- fired, thermal-electric units with capacity sizes of 60 MWe, 100 MWe, 200 MWe and 300 MWe in multi-unit generating stations. During the period from 1955 to 1958, Ontario Hydro planners concluded that electricity from coal-fired generating stations in Ontario would be most economic if generated in multi-unit generating stations, with units up to 500 MWe capacity under consideration - far greater than the 50 MWe units built up to 1950. Such large unit, multi-unit stations, posed a major economic challenge to the Canadian Nuclear-Electric program.
Atomic Energy of Canada Studies 1955 to 1958
A second AECL team at Chalk River called the Nuclear Power Group, led by an Ontario Hydro manager, studied the economics of alternative nuclear-electric concepts between 1955 and 1958 while NPD1 was being built. The studies of this team resulted in a nuclear-electric generating station concept which promised a lower electricity total unit energy cost than a large coal-fired thermal-electric multi-unit station in Ontario.
The following major conclusions resulted from this study.
(1) It became clear that a nuclear-electric generating station using a pressure vessel, heavy water moderator and natural uranium fuel had little or no hope of economically competing with large unit, coal-fired stations in Ontario or elsewhere in Canada. The long migration length of neutrons in a heavy water moderator required a pressure vessel larger than required for light water reactors.
(2) This new concept called CANDU-PHW (CANadian Deuterium Uranium-Pressurized Heavy Water) developed by this team promised competitive nuclear-electric power for base load applications. This concept featured: a heavy water moderator, zircaloy pressure tubes rather than a pressure vessel, natural uranium dioxide fuel, and bi-directional on-power fuelling in a horizontal reactor. Note: Zirconium Niobium Pressure Tubes were introduced at a later stage of the Canadian nuclear program (Pickering units 3 and 4).
(3) The study suggested the Total Unit Energy Cost from a nuclear-electric station from a second large sized commercial nuclear generating station would be economically competitive with alternative coal-fired stations.
(4) Uranium is indigenous to Canada and would substitute for the ever increasing amounts of coal from the USA.
(5) During the early 1950s, an intense high level of public environmental concern had developed in Ontario because of the emissions of particulates, sulphur dioxide, and nitrous oxides from coal-fired generating stations.
Nuclear Power Plant Design Competition Not Viable
Considering the small population in Canada and in particular in Ontario, Ontario Hydro concluded that only a few large unit, multi-unit, nuclear or thermal-electric stations would be required to meet electricity requirements in the foreseeable future in Ontario and Canada. Ontario Hydro and AECL subsequently concluded that two or more than two competitive nuclear power plant designers in Canada was not a viable alternative. Note: Other countries, with populations larger than Canada, such as the UK and France, reluctantly came to the same conclusion many years later.
Part 4 NPD1 CANCELLED AND NPD2 BUILT (1958 to 1962)
NPD1 Cancelled and NPD2 Committed 1958
In 1958, Atomic Energy of Canada and Ontario Hydro made an agonizing set of decisions. But in hindsight, in my opinion, they were good decisions.
(1) The design and construction of NPD, now known as NPD1, was terminated.
(2) NPD2 was committed which featured the new CANDU concept with a heavy water moderator, zircaloy pressure tubes, natural uranium dioxide fuel, a horizontal reactor, and on-power fuelling.
(3) The plan to establish competing private nuclear design & construction companies in Canada was abandoned.. Future designs were to be supplied by one national agency. The Nuclear Power Plant Division of AECL was established in Toronto and proceeded immediately with the design of the 200 MWe Douglas Point Prototype station. At that time I personally knew every person in the Canadian General Electric design team which was called the Civilian Atomic Power Department. This department employed many highly competent people. Naturally, they were very disappointed with this decision.
(4) Planning studies were initiated regarding the possible early commitment of a Commercial Multi-Unit Nuclear Electric Station featuring 500 Mwe units.
(5) A target was set to design, construct and commission NPD2 by 1961, a very ambitious 3 year design and construction target for such a new concept.
(6) The responsibilities for the research & development, design, construction, commissioning
and operation for NPD2 were to be the same as for NPD1.
(7) The pressure tubes were a critical unproven component of the CANDU- PHW concept. It was assumed that the pressure tubes would be replaced after 15 years of operation.
This CANDU-PHW concept became the major thrust of the Canadian Nuclear Program. However, Atomic Energy of Canada continued to study and develop other concepts which featured alternate heat transport such as organics and boiling light water.
Part 5 NPD2 EXPERIENCE (Starting 1962)
NPD2 In-Service Date
I have already mentioned that NPD2, or if you wish NPD, produced first electricity on June 4, 1962 . In steps, it was raised to the full power of 22 MWe and was declared In-Service on October1, 1962. The In-Service date was late by 1.3 years.
CANDU Concept - Major Concerns -1958
When NPD2 was committed, some of the major concerns were as follows:
1. Would it be practical to build a heat transport system to operate at high pressure and high temperature, or would the loss of high cost heavy water make it economically impractical?
2. Would the pressure tubes be reliable? Would they meet the original 15 year target life before replacement?
3. Could pump seals be developed to operate at high pressure and high temperature without significant heavy water losses?
4. Could reliable on-power fuelling machines be developed?
5. Could high pressure boilers to transfer heat from heavy water to ordinary water be built at reasonable cost?
6. Would the nuclear fuel yield high burnup and low failure rate?
7. Would the reactor be safe for the public and workers?
8. Would this concept of CANDU -PHW lead to economically competitive electricity cost in large commercial units operating on base load?
Successful Commercial Program
In the next presentation of this plenary session, Bill Morison will be describing the highly successful commercial nuclear-program. I propose to briefly mention some of the important contributions of NPD2 leading to the success of this program.
Prove Technical Viability
NPD provided the proof the CANDU-PHW concept was technically a viable method of producing electricity. This was an important communication to:
- senior members of Atomic Energy of Canada;
- senior members of Canadian Utilities and in particular to Ontario Hydro;
- politicians in Canada and in particular to the Federal Government and to the Province of Ontario;
- and most important, the Canadian public.
Heavy Water Upkeep Cost
One of the major questions about the CANDU-PHW concept was whether or not the heavy water losses and heavy water upgrading costs would be economically acceptable. The early operation of NPD2 demonstrated that the initial design of NPD2 was not acceptable and that the cost of heavy water losses and upgrading was too high. The plant operators initiated a major modification to the plant by having a Heavy Water Vapor Recovery System installed. The new approach to the future was (a) take all practical economic measures to minimize heavy water leakage and (b) recover both liquid and vapor heavy water leakage. Subsequent operations over many years in NPD2 and later stations proved that the cost of heavy water upkeep was economically acceptable.
The first successful on-power fuelling was achieved on November 23,1963. Some features of the first on-power fuelling design were satisfactory and some features were not satisfactory. A new Mark II on-power fuelling machine design was developed by the Canadian General Electric Company for NPD2. This Mark II design was installed in 1969 and was highly successful.
The NPD fuel bundle performance was excellent in respect to reliability and cost and proved the soundness of the design, estimated high burnup, and manufacturing process. Later bundle designs for the commercial units were larger and required some additional development work.
Performance Measurement System
NPD2 established a comprehensive set of objectives and a system of performance measurements. These quantified measures pertained to: employee safety, public safety, production reliability, environmental protection and total electricity cost. This system of objectives and performance measures was maintained at all future stations. Performance results were fed back to senior management, planners, designers, manufacturers, and research and development.
Engineers with operating experience were attached to the design organization to review and comment on new designs.
Deficiency reports were recorded for each event that reduced the performance associated with any objective. These deficiency reports were analysed and the following actions taken:
(a) Modifications in design, equipment, operating procedures and training were made to improve future performance.
(b) Feedback was given to researchers, developers, designers, and manufacturers which included identification of deficiencies and in some cases suggestions for improvement of future stations.
(c) Many persons with operating experience later became employees of design organizations.
Employee worker safety targets were established and the results were measured every year at NPD2 and subsequent nuclear stations. The targets required that employees on the average be safer at work than not at work. This included the risk of radiation exposure. I know of no other major industry in North America which had a better worker safety performance than nuclear-electric stations in Canada (average Canadian performance for the entire nuclear-electric industry during the 40 year period from 1962 to 2002). I have been advised that USA nuclear-electric performance in recent years has exceeded the Canadian performance.
NPD2 led the way in both design and operations to establish a risk analysis and measurement system to ensure acceptable public safety. The world nuclear-electric industry has suffered a lot of bad press as a result of the Chernobyl Accident in the former USSR and the 3-Mile Island Accident in the USA. However, the Canadian record for public safety during the first 40 years has been better than any other major form of electric generation (considering deaths, life shortening and health impairment).
It is my opinion or judgement or speculation or whatever else you wish to call it, there will be more but infrequent nuclear accidents in the western world but that in the long term nuclear-electric generation will continue to have a superior public safety record per kWh than other major forms of electric generation.
The nuclear-electric program must consider public safety and environmental protection during the entire life-cycle from uranium mining up to and including disposal of radioactive waste. During and prior to World War 2 there were uranium mining, processing and refining activities in Canada that had serious adverse consequences. However, the competitive Ontario Hydro procurement program for uranium fuel required high safety standards to be met during mining and manufacture. Ted Bazeley will be talking about this program later in this plenary session.
NPD sacrificed its capability factor performance to permit equipment and fuel development, testing and operator training. The causes of lost production were identified and the causes of these problems were fed back to designers and manufacturers. The lessons learned at NPD contributed to the high reliability performance achievements in subsequent nuclear generating stations in Canada.
Comprehensive Cost Records
A Uniform Subject Index was established as a design, construction, commissioning, operating and accounting base for NPD2 and subsequent nuclear-electric units. A comprehensive cost reporting system was established. Note: NPD2 did not prove that CANDU was economically competitive for base-load application. This proof had to wait until after the large commercial units were started.
In 1958, the CANDU-PHW concept assumed a 15 year economic lifetime of the pressure tubes. However, many researchers, designers and operators had come to believe the lifetime would be much longer. In 1958, when NPD2 was committed, the concept of zircaloy high pressure, high temperature, pressure tubes with low neutron capture was unproven. NPD2 was used not only to monitor the performance of pressure tubes but also for development of new pressure tube designs and materials. NPD2 did not give advance warning of the first pressure tube failure in Pickering in 1983. In NPD, the pressure tubes were a smaller diameter, were subject to a lower neutron flux, and had a different design of spacers separating the pressure tubes from the calandria tubes.
Part 6 TWO RETROSPECTIVE COMMENTARIES
I know that I am a retired old man and I know that my knowledge of the current nuclear program is somewhat obsolete. Nevertheless, the word ‘retrospective’ was used in conjunction with this plenary session - what did we learn from our past experiences. Accordingly before closing, I would like to offer two retrospective commentaries.
Atomic Energy Control Board (Now the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission)
NPD, the first nuclear-electric generating station in Canada was also the first nuclear-electric unit which was required to be reviewed and approved by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB). I strongly support the concept that Canada and other nations should have a truly competent independent regulatory authority to review and approve the operation of nuclear-electric stations and its associated activities. I understand why the design and operating staff of AECL and Canadian Utilities have sometimes been frustrated with the slowness and the decisions of the AECB, and in fairness I understand the reverse to be equally true. I am not so naive that I would expect such frustrations of applicants and regulators can be totally eliminated.
To be responsible in meeting their mandate, the AECB has faced a very difficult challenge and many competent people in the AECB have worked hard to meet this challenge.
I would like to encourage future staff in Canada’s nuclear regulatory authority to remember that no form of generation has or will have perfect public safety or perfect environmental protection. I understand and appreciate the need for the nuclear industry and the regulatory agency to have some deterministic or prescriptive criteria but suggest they be kept to a minimum. I prefer the emphasis be a risk based approach which was first established at NPD. Unjustified additional requirements (costs) imposed on the nuclear industry by any agency will in the long term result in a shift between alternative forms of generation and may thereby result in increased worker and public deaths, life shortening or health impairment if the alternative forms of energy have less imposing requirements. In other words, I am suggesting that total society risk is most important and urge future regulatory staff to keep this in mind.
I hasten to add that both the Canadian nuclear industry and the Canadian regulators must continue to pursue and achieve high standards of public safety and environmental protection.
Nuclear Operations Staff Recruitment and Training
At NPD2 a Nuclear Training Centre was established. This training centre had the following responsibilities:
(1) To recruit the right kinds of people and the right numbers of people to meet the requirements for all nuclear operating positions at all locations at the right time.
(2) To manage the initial training of all nuclear operations employees.
(3) To manage the training and qualification programs of nuclear operations personnel.
This centre provided the recruitment and training for all kinds of positions at the operating stations such as operators, maintenance, technical staff, supervisors, chemical control, and managers.
The planning, recruitment, and training requirements was a formidable task to meet the rapidly expanding requirements beyond NPD: Douglas Point, Pickering A, Bruce A, Pickering B, Bruce B and Darlington as well as training services provided to other Canadian utilities and overseas projects. The staffing also had to consider the extra requirements during the commissioning, provide trainers, and meet special demands for activities such as retubing.
The Nuclear Training Centre was provided a staffing plan each year which forecast the required numbers of staff, for each position, for each location. The training of personnel included real shutdowns, change of power levels, and startups of NPD. High standards of qualification were established and met. At a later stage in the program, station simulators were built, and other advanced training centres were built. This was a vital program to contribute to the past high performance of Ontario Hydro’s commercial nuclear stations during the 1970s and 80s. The disruption of this recruitment & training program and the decimation of the Ontario Hydro’s trained nuclear staff in the latter part of the last century is another story. My first hand knowledge of Ontario Hydro operations, including nuclear operations, ended in 1982. My knowledge of events during the period from 1982 to 2002 is second hand. Based on the foregoing, it is my current opinion, that this nuclear training failure was, in general, not due to actions or inactions of the managers directly responsible for nuclear operations. The resulting inadequate operating staff was a major contributor to the reduced nuclear performance of commercial nuclear stations during the 1990s and the decision to shutdown 8 large commercial units in 1997.
In retrospect, and regardless of who was at fault in the past, this nuclear training failure experience reenforces the following comments:
(1) it is absolutely vital that operating staffs responsibly: plan, recruit, train and qualify the necessary people on schedule
(2) it is equally imperative that the corporate directors and senior staff in the responsible organization: endorse, approve and support the implementation of plans that will ensure the needs are met..
(3) senior management may impose cost restraints or budget cuts based on a critical analysis that has been conducted with care and thoroughness.
(4) a corporation operating one or more nuclear units that makes ruthless arbitrary cuts across an entire corporation is acting irresponsibly.
(5) The Total Unit Energy Cost in a base load nuclear generating station is very sensitive to the achievement of a high capability factor and it makes sound economic sense to have an operating staff that can achieve good reliability results. Unwarranted reductions in operating staff reduces the OM&A costs (operations and maintenance costs) but simultaneously increases the total costs to the electricity customer.
(6) I presented a paper at the Sixth Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference September 7-11, 1987 called “ A Recipe for Nuclear Operations Success”. I believe that recipe is still valid today.
In closing, I would like to thank the Deep River Branch of the Canadian Nuclear Society for this opportunity to share in this celebration of this 40th Anniversary of NPD and in particular thank Jeremy Whitlock for his advice and guidance.